

State-led coastal transformation in South Aegean Türkiye: Multiscalar interventions and oppositional movements in the case of Datça Muğla

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Abstract

The article aims to reveal the contentious politics behind the state-led coastal transformation in South Aegean Türkiye by concentrating on the emblematic case of Datça Muğla. The research on Türkiye's coastal transformation is still inadequate, particularly to analyze the role of the state, its policies, interventions and counter movements. The article underlies on the main argument that the coastal transformation in Türkiye manifests remarkable urban development to explore the role of the state policies and the socio-political reactions against them. The state initiated the coastal transformation process via the enforcement of key legislations and associated governmental regulations, and the top-down implementation of development plans and flagships projects. Fostered by the powerful market forces, these state-led practices are confronted with conflicts and social struggles at multiple scales of urban policymaking. The article draws on comprehensive research, employed multiple methods including a content analysis of coastal legislations, a documentary analysis of the key coastal plans and projects and lastly, a critical examination of some remarkable lawsuits, news and new governmental regulations on the coasts of Datça peninsula. As the case of Datça illustrates, a new conservation legislation at the macro-scale, the new yacht port and tourism-induced coastal development projects at the meso-scale, and the occupation of the public beaches by many legally constructed ways at the micro-scale, have consistently reconfigured the multiscalar interventions in the coastal transformation processes. The article presents original findings for reconsidering planning policies for coastal areas and calls for a broader public discussion.

Keywords

Coastal transformation, Multiscalar interventions, Oppositional movements, Datça Muğla, Türkiye.

1. Introduction: The coastal transformation, the role of the state and the contested spatial planning and governance arrangements

As neoliberal policies have deepened and evolved over time, they have gained destructive momentum on the transformation of cities and environments (Brenner & Theodore, 2002; Harvey, 2005). In the last four decades of the intertwined political, urban and environmental transformation, urban spaces have imploded and exploded in Lefebvre's (2003) terms of "urban revolution". Portrayed by the concept of "planetary urbanization", this unprecedented global moment of concentrated and extended urban development has dominated the profit-driven capitalist logic of neoliberal urbanization over all forms of urban-rural spaces and environments (Brenner, 2014; Brenner & Schmid, 2015). Undoubtedly, coastal areas have emerged as one of the profoundly impacted urban-rural habitats, dramatically transformed under this dominant logic of neoliberal urban development at planetary scale (Carraro et al., 2021; Rubin, 2010; Steel et al., 2017; Ward & Swyngedouw, 2018). Thus, in this context of the globally far-reaching urban development, there is a need to reexamine the role of the state and to reveal the multiscalar and interrelated forms of the coastal transformation by analyzing the contested and multifarious spatial planning and governance arrangements.

The profit-driven transformation of coastal areas under the state-coordinated interventionist role has progressed in line with the proliferated forms of privatization, commodification, enclosure and gentrification (Freeman & Cheyne, 2008; Hadjimichael, 2018; Kahl, 2020; Lin & Zhang, 2015; Van Noorloos, 2011). Such capitalist interventions by the governmental regulations have become the neoliberal driving forces, dramatically transformed coastal geographies and spark off contested and conflict-laden urban politics across the globe (Ounanian & Howells, 2024). The role of the state and state-coordinated spatial planning and governance arrangements in coastal

transformation variegated across the global North and South (Avila-Garcia & Sanchez, 2012; Heidkamp & Morrissey, 2019; Keul, 2015). In most of the early-capitalist countries of the global North, these arrangements are mostly based on sustainable development principles, rely on public-private partnerships, consider long-term and intergenerational societal benefits, and are not rapidly changed by governments to meet the short-term interests of market logic (Müller & Wilson, 2024). On the contrary, in the late-capitalist countries of the global South such as Türkiye, owing to the prevailing tendency towards capital accumulation in a short period of time, governments privilege private interests over public good (Şengül, 2009; Türkün, 2011), enforce numerous laws on urban development (Balaban, 2012; Kilinc & Turk, 2021), triggers fast urban policy-making (Bayırbağ, 2013; Penpecioglu & Bayırbağ, 2024), which in the long run leads to authority conflicts and contestations in urban planning (Taşan-Kok, 2021; Ünsal & Türk, 2014), induces rapid and unsustainable forms of urban development (Enlil & Dinçer, 2022; Gezici, 2006).

Resembling with the global South in terms of urban policies and government decisions on planning, Türkiye's coastal areas have been exposed to this fast-paced and ecologically destructive planetary urbanization process. Based on this critical theoretical framework, the article investigates the coastal transformation in the case of Datça Muğla by establishing analytical links with the fast-paced capitalist spatial transformation characterized by the global South (Acara & Penpecioglu, 2022; Penpecioglu & Bayırbağ, 2024). Therefore, the state's spatial planning and governance arrangements, its dominant policies, legislative roles and multi-scalar interventions and the raising oppositional social movements against such policies-legislations-interventions have all constituted the empirical cornerstones in our analysis of the coastal transformation.

In Türkiye, although the legislative power and its multi-scalar interventions in different scales of policymaking have accelerated in the hands of

central government, all these state-led interventions do not take place in an uncontested and conflict-free medium of politics (Eraydin & Taşan-Kok, 2014; Ergenc & Yüksekaya, 2022; Tansel, 2020). Rather, they inevitably cause contestations, raise counter movements and ultimately leads to contentious politics, consisted of various protests and oppositions by environmental groups, political conflicts between the local and central governments, criticism and lawsuits from professional chambers etc. (Bayırbağ & Schindler, 2022; Ergenc & Yüksekaya, 2022; Kayasü & Yetiskul Senbil, 2014; Penpecioglu, 2013; Penpecioglu, 2016; Sanli & Townshend, 2018).

Rather than the primacy of the sustainable and comprehensive long-term master plans, the cities has been governed though the piecemeal, profit-driven, project-based operations with a short-term market-dominated logic of private sector (Balaban, 2012; Bayırbağ & Schindler, 2022; Dinçer, 2011; Gezici & Er, 2014). Under the siege of this neoliberal urbanization, urban development plans not only defined as the capitalist interventions in favor of change, operated at multiple scales of policymaking; they have also manipulated the existing legal frameworks of planning, meaning to exploit the ambiguities and legal loopholes in the existing legislations-regulations, to enact development amnesties and to bypass master plans for the sake of market driven project-based interventions to cities (Dinçer, 2011; Enlil & Dinçer, 2022; Kuyucu, 2014; Penpecioglu, et al., 2022).

In this context of contested urban policy making, state-led legislative and plan-based interventions for the coastal areas attracted serious criticism and oppositional movements by many of the public and civil society institutions, including professional chambers, environmentalist non-governmental organizations and the right to the city movements. In coastal areas, particularly in the Aegean region, small towns, natural conservation sites and agricultural production areas have all become the contested sites of a fierce struggle between the state-led interventions and oppositional movements (Ersoy,

2006; Penpecioglu, 2013). Thus, the state's legislative and plan-based interventions become subjected to delays, contestations and serious criticism and socio-political conflicts in most of the times (Ay & Penpecioglu, 2023; Keskinok, 2022).

At this point, it is crucial to highlight the issue of conflict of authority in the urban planning and governance context of Türkiye. Central and local government institutions often possess overlapping and/or conflictual authorities to make plans for the same area, leading to a fragmented and conflictual governmental landscape of spatial planning, resulting in delays in project implementation, increased tensions between ministries and municipalities, and unmet demands of the communities (Sanli & Townshend, 2018). The lack of a cohesive planning framework exacerbates these conflicts, as different governmental authorities prioritize divergent interests, often influenced by neoliberal agendas (Dokumaci & Polat, 2024; Duyguluer, 2006; Özluer, 2015; Ulu, 2012). Understanding this dynamic and contested governmental landscape is essential for comprehensively analyzing the coastal transformation processes in Türkiye in terms of legislative interventions.

To delve into the coastal transformation process and to explicate its underlying state regulations, the article exhibits a threefold critical analysis at hierarchically linked scales of policymaking: analysis of macro-scale, meso-scale and micro-scale interventions. As the multiscale analysis reveals in the following sections, government and market forces cooperate via the employment of diverse methods, projects, instruments and practices, mostly embodied as legislative and plan-based interventions to the coasts. The multiscale interventions by the state have played a pioneering role in this transformation; therefore, the main analytical perspective of the article is to unveil the embodiment of state-led coastal transformation.

In the following section of the article, we explain the research method in detail. In the third section, we drew on some critical analysis of the key legislative and plan-based interventions

to coastal transformation in Türkiye and shed light upon the main reasons behind the formation of oppositional movements. In the fourth section, we critically elaborate the underlying socio-spatial indicators of Datça's coastal transformation. In the fifth section, we examine the multiscale configuration on the coastal transformation process by reflecting on legislative and plan-based interventions in the case of Datça. In the final section, the meanings of these coastal interventions and their socio-spatial implications are discussed.

2. Materials and methods

The research employed a multi-methodological and multi-scalar approach to investigate the contentious politics behind the state-led coastal transformation. The methods include literature review, the content analysis of legislations, the documentary analysis of coastal plans and projects, the media analysis, the critical examination of legal cases and reports and on-site observations.

The article provides a critical examination of the major legislative interventions at macro scales of urban change defining the main role of the state in coastal transformation. Before focusing on the case of Datça, the article manifests a critical evaluation of some meso-scale coastal transformation projects (from the cities of İstanbul and Muğla) by reflecting key findings from the documentary and media analysis.

The case study on Datça Peninsula covers a critical analysis of planning documents, official maps, development proposals and project reports, which is also examined as macro-scale drivers of the coastal transformation (The Report and Maps on Datça-Bozburun Special Environmental Protection Zone; Aydın-Muğla-Denizli Environmental Plan; The Report and Maps on The Natural Protection Sites of Datça etc.). Furthermore, analyzing the main targets, and implementations of the flagship coastal projects initiated by the state (in Kargı bay and a New Marina Project in the Datça city center) and drawing on the secondary sources, such as court cases, media coverage, and newly introduced governmental regulations

have all provided critical insights into the socio-political conflicts, struggles, and counter-mobilizations that have emerged as a response to state-led coastal transformation efforts.

At the micro scale of intervention, the research reveals how hotels, residential complexes, and commercial establishments occupy beaches of Datça and restricts public uses through the participant observations and on-site analysis by the authors. The research draws on the primary and secondary sources of data collected via these methods, and they have been analyzed in a complementary way to develop a comprehensive understanding of the multi-scalar interventions and the dominant, often unsustainable, trends shaping the transformation of Datça's coasts.

The primary and secondary sources of data include development plans, urban development projects, various reports, lawsuit documents, expert reports, and the related media coverage. It is important to note that these sources such as evaluation reports and media coverage often contain subjective interpretations, particularly within the context of Türkiye. Therefore, we must clarify our approach to using such materials as academic sources. Initially, we examined and evaluated the main public documents (Laws, legislation, plans and their reports etc.) prepared by official authorities before incorporating secondary sources into our analysis. The content presented in this research has been taken into consideration objectively concerning urban policies, development plans, and legislative interventions.

The findings from this mixed-methodological approach are presented in the article to highlight the pivotal role of the state, the influence of market forces, and the contestation by various oppositional actors in the coastal transformation processes.

3. Türkiye's coastal transformation: Contentious politics and movements vis a vis legislative and plan-based interventions

The right to the coast, the access to seashores and public beaches has a constitutional legal background in

Türkiye. According to the Law on Coastal Areas, coasts are “open to the public, equal and free use of everyone” and “priority is given to the public interest in the use of coastal areas and shorelines” (Coastal Law, 1990). However, the state-led neoliberal urban policies and the associated enclosure practices prioritize the commodification and privatization over the coastal areas. One of the most important issues regarding the protection of coasts in this law is the minimum distance of 100 meters from the coastline for public use; however, this regulation is not universally applicable across different coastal morphologies and geographic contexts (Coastal Law, 1990). In many instances, such a distance is inadequate to protect sensitive ecosystems or to accommodate the diverse needs of local communities. Furthermore, the enforcement of this law has often been undermined by neoliberal urban policies that prioritize privatization and commodification of coastal areas.

Some dominant projects and practice have been illustrative of multiscalar interventions. Firstly, in the metropolitan cities, regional mega projects and large-scale transportation and infrastructure investments operate as macro-scale drivers of coastal change. Secondly, flagship and profit-oriented urban development or regeneration projects in the coasts have become key meso-scale interventions to reproduce the urban space in line with the powerful political-economic interests. Thirdly, there are micro-scale interventions to shorelines and beaches, restricting the public access and transforming the user profile, prioritizing high-income groups while neglecting the right of the people to free access to the coasts. All these multiscalar interventions implement various land use functions, having high rent production potentials, such as luxury housing and gated residents, yacht ports and marinas, hotels and shopping malls.

The macro-scale interventions to the coast include mega projects targeting mixed-use and upper-income groups, as well as regional transportation infrastructure investments. Privatization of publicly owned areas, yacht ports

and marinas on the coasts are instances of meso-scale interventions. On the micro-scale, the occupation of beaches by hotels and other private companies is a well-known dominant practice to illustrate, resulting in the enclosure of certain parts of the coast. The dominant character of all these activities is that the state-led policies and legislative interventions facilitate the operation of the powerful market forces in the transformation of coastal areas. The pursued neo-liberal urban policies stimulate the deepening commodification of the coastal areas, thus not only in Türkiye but also in many instances all over the world, capital accumulation in the form of urban rent production take precedence over public use and public interest. (Avila-Garcia & Sanchez, 2012; Cive & Avar, 2019; Keul, 2015).

There are many examples and international cases of state interventions at macro-scale in the transformation of coastlines. As the well-known and historical cases, docklands/waterfront regeneration projects of London and Baltimore exemplify the complexities and contradictions inherent in neoliberal urban policies during 1980s and 1990s. While these initiatives aim to stimulate economic growth and attract investment, they frequently undermine public good, leading to social displacement and exacerbated existing socio-spatial injustices (Butler, 2007; Jones, 1998). More recent cases could be found in the global South. Brazilian Federal Government implemented the Growth Acceleration Program (PAC) between 2007 and 2010, which included several economic stimulus packages and institutional reforms aimed at promoting economic growth. Essentially, this program sought to revive the role of the federal government as a planner of economic development by eliminating bottlenecks through infrastructure projects. This initiative covers port expansion projects, large transportation and infrastructure developments, and tourism projects in coastal cities. However, it often leads to the displacement of communities and prioritized investor interests over local needs (Denaldi & Cardoso, 2021; Mereb & Zilberman, 2012; Palma, 2012). Like Brazil, Co-

lombia also implements various large-scale infrastructure development projects, such as highways and ports. These projects prioritize economic growth but often result in social conflicts and the displacement of marginalized populations (Daheshpour, & Herbert, 2018; Nieto-Parra, et al, 2013).

As a macro-scale intervention to Türkiye's northern coasts, The Black Sea Coastal Highway Project designed with the claim of facilitating the regional and national transportation, stimulating the regional and national trade networks. This highway is a highly debated project that passes through approximately 1500 km and 14 cities located on the northern coast of the country (Figure 1). There are two major state-led legislative and plan-based interventions in the implementation of the project: First, the release of international loans, second the preparation of new urban development plans by central government. Legal interventions have continued although there are objections, criticism and many other forms of struggle against the project.

A group of residents, environmental activists and academicians opposed the project. Criticisms argued that this project will have destructive influences on marine ecosystem, and it will negatively influence public access to the coast, while triggering uncontrolled and unsustainable linear urban development [1]. Moreover, owing to the rapid urbanization trends in the Black Sea Region, the highway, rapidly turned into an urban road and has caused further transportation and traffic problems (Çakıroğlu, 2007; Yılmaz, 2008). Although the development plans submitted to the judiciary are annulled in the lower courts, the upper courts overturn the annulment decisions. Even if the municipality seals the parts where the project was canceled, the construction activities never stop. As a result, the plans are canceled 8 years after the completion of the road [2]; however, it is not possible to demolish the filling areas. Years later, "science is proven right" and the marine ecosystem is negatively affected by the filling areas, and disasters such as erosion and floods occur in various parts of the road [3].




Figure 1. The Route of The Black Sea Coastal Highway, produced by the authors.

Meso-scale interventions in urban development often highlight the tension between market-driven policies and the public good, as observed in various global contexts. For instance, Argentina's urban coastal renewal projects, particularly in cities like Buenos Aires, have transformed coastal neighborhoods to attract tourism and commercial investment. While these initiatives have succeeded in revitalizing certain areas, they frequently displace low-income residents, raising concerns about social equity and access to urban resources (Rodríguez & Di Virgilio, 2016). Similarly, Ecuador's coastal development projects prioritize private investment in resorts over local community access to beaches, limiting opportunities for local populations to engage with their coastal environment (Epler & Olsen, 1993). In Kenya, Nairobi's urban renewal initiatives aim to modernize the city but often lead to gentrification and a loss of affordable housing for existing residents. Chile's waterfront redevelopment projects, particularly in Valparaíso, focus on creating luxury developments that restrict public access to waterfront areas (Klaufus, et al., 2017). Additionally, the Philippines' Boracay Island rehabilitation has prioritized high-end tourism development, resulting in the closure of public areas and the displacement of local communities (Rowan, 2011).

Türkiye's coastal projects do not significantly differ from these transformations observed in the global South. For instance, as a meso-scale intervention, the Transformation Projects of the Karaköy-Salıpazarı area and Galataport have strategic importance in many aspects in Türkiye (Figure 2). This project has undergone a contested and lengthy construction process.



Figure 2. Galataport Project Area, produced by the authors using Google Maps satellite map.

Many criticisms of the project point out negative influences: the closure of the publicly owned shoreline; its negative impact upon the urban silhouette, the demolition of some historical buildings in the urban conservation site and lastly, gentrification and its negative influences. Professional chambers filed lawsuits against the project, arguing that it violates the laws on coasts and conservation. Although there was a decision to cancel the plans by the courts, the plans and tenders were renewed in a similar manner each time [4]. The project has become a driving force to lead urban gentrification process, and a touristic port is constructed for large cruise ships, luxury hotels and restaurants, museums, and shopping malls as well [5].

Micro-scale interventions particularly focus on the restriction of the daily use of the public beaches, which were previously used by the public, then enclosed by private companies. At the micro-scale, the impact of neoliberal policies on local communities is deepened via the enactment of multifarious mechanisms restricting public access to coastal areas. Such interventions are particularly common in cities of the global South. In Honduras, for instance, beachfront hotel developments by private companies occupy public beach spaces for luxury resorts, altering community dynamics and limiting local access (Loperena, 2012). Peru's

coastal developments similarly involve constructing private beachfront properties that encroach upon traditionally accessible areas for residents (Scheuring, 2017). In Ghana, the privatization of coastal lands for development by foreign investors restricts access for local fishing communities, undermining their livelihoods (Ayilu, 2023). Morocco's coastal tourism projects prioritize foreign investment while limiting access for local populations (Almeida-García, 2018; Caffyn & Jobbins, 2003). In Cancun, Mexico, hotels and resorts have taken over public beach areas, prioritizing tourist experiences over community rights (Basurto Cisneros, 2016). These examples collectively illustrate how market-oriented interventions can compromise public good and exacerbate social inequalities in coastal and urban settings.

In Türkiye, according to the Coastal Law (1990), the beaches are defined as public assets with a minimum width of 100 meters horizontally from the coastline. Private developments frequently encroach upon these designated public spaces, restricting access for public use and excluding local populations. This phenomenon reflects a broader trend where market-oriented interventions dominate over the public interest, leading to conflicts over coastal access and usage. However, many hotels, residential complexes, and commercial estab-

lishments occupy beach areas in this 100-meter line, by setting up umbrellas, beach chairs, cabanas, tables and chairs, which leads to the unequal use of beaches by the public. Some of these beach occupations have a legal basis (such as renting from the public institutions). Businesses that occupy beaches without adhering to any rules are not sanctioned, and even if sanctions are applied, they are not deterrent (Aslan, 2023). Various resistance practices are emerging against this commercial occupation of beach areas. An example of this is the “towel movement” in Greece [6] and in parallel to this movement, in Türkiye’s coastal towns like Ayvalık, Marmaris, Çeşme, Bodrum and Datça, some oppositional movements are organized against the enclosure of beaches to the public [7] (Figure 3).

Türkiye’s coastal transformation unfolds in a state-led strategy prioritizing capitalist interests over the public good. This conflict-laden socio-political process operating at multiples scales of policymaking leads to the contentious politics in which multi-scalar interven-



Figure 3. “Towel Movement” organized at Paros Island, <https://www.turizmaktuel.com>.

tions by the state are opposed by many resistances and occupy movements, several lawsuits and social struggles (Table 1).

The state’s legislative and plan-based interventions are not conducted in a proper and conflict-free way; rather, at each scale of politics, it embarks the rise of multifarious oppositions. Thus, a contentious politics of coastal transformation has been shaped under the socio-political struggles of multiple actors. The next section draws on the key findings from the emblematic case of Datça, Muğla.

Table 1. Summary of the interventions, oppositions and responses for each scale.

Scale	Interventions	Oppositions	Responds/impacts
Macro-scale	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Neo-liberal urban policies Mega projects (regional transportation and infrastructure etc.) Changing laws and regulations prioritizing development over conservation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Organization of environmental justice movements Preparation of critical documents against the macro-scale plans/projects Filing lawsuits against macro-scale plans/projects 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Complexity of the spatial legislation Conflicts of spatial planning authorities Prolonged legal processes owing to lawsuits The lack of governments’ response to official objections Non-implementation of penal actions
Meso-scale	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Privatization of public lands Fragmented and piecemeal urban projects The new urban development plans by central government 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Organization of coastal movements Preparation of critical documents against the meso-scale plans/projects Filing lawsuits against meso-scale plans/ projects Organizing various events in the coastal project sites to create public opinion 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Resubmission of canceled plans and projects in the same or very similar form Urban/rural gentrification process Increase of expenses
Micro-scale	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Occupation of beaches Enclosure of certain parts of the coasts 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Resistance practices such as “towel movement” etc. Preparation of critical documents against the micro-scale plans/ projects Filing lawsuits against micro-scale plans/ projects 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Displacement of local people Disengagement of people from the coast Ecological destruction

4. Datça Muğla as an emblematic case of the coastal transformation

Muğla is the province with the highest coastal length (1479 km.), located in the South Aegean Türkiye. Datça as a unique and untouched peninsula/district with the highest coastal length in Muğla (474 km.), has ecological diversity that needs to be protected. In 1991, officially declared as Special Environmental Protection Zone by the decision of the Council of Ministers, owing to this protection status in addition to the transportation problems, Datça Peninsula remained unspoiled when compared to the other tourism-oriented coastal towns in the Aegean region of Türkiye. However, in the last two decades, transportation to Datça became easier and with the influences of the other factors including the proliferation of remote working, the heightened demand for property development, the new lifestyle migration trends, and the new housing preferences to coastal towns (Kaba & Südaş, 2022; Zekiroğlu, 2020; Demirtaş Milz, et al., 2024).

As the new trends of neoliberal urbanization target ecologically diverse natural and coastal sites, local culture and heritage, locally authentic small towns, the coastal sites and settlements have become subordinated to the logic of market forces within the sustainable strategies. Like Datça, many of the small and middle-sized coastal towns and districts in the Aegean and Mediterranean region have all confronted with several urban pressures including the heightened property demand, the life-style migration and gentrification, the unequal use of the coasts and the skyrocketed costs of housing (Çakır Kılınçoğlu, 2019; Gündüz & Güneş, 2020).

Today, Datça become an attractive tourism destination; the number of apart and boutique hotels increased in

addition to a steady rise in the number of life-style migrants. Housing demand and prices soared as many more people prefer to settle in the district. As a result, the pressure of residential use on the coast has increased. Like short-term accommodations for tourism purposes, a dominant trend towards seasonal or permanent migration to Datça has begun (Memiş, et al., 2023). This transformation unfold in two major aspects of social change: (1) one at the socio-spatial level indicating the problem of illegal construction, inadequate public transport and infrastructure systems, increasing traffic and pollution problems, skyrocketed housing prices etc., (2) the other signifying the socio-demographic driving forces consisted of the flexible and remote working conditions, the dominance of the digital platforms and social media over the urbanization and tourism trends; the new life-style migrants and the social incoherence and socio-political disagreements between the new comers and local people (Demirtaş-Milz, et al., 2024). These two related and conflict-laden aspects of change have remarkably co-influenced the dramatic coastal transformation process of the peninsula. All these manifold ways of transformation could be mainly traced by the increasing number of population and built-up areas. The population of Datça, which was 13,914 in 2000, reached 16,475 in 2010 and 25,029 in 2022 (Table 2). It has become one of the districts with the fastest population growth in Muğla province.

Owing to the multiple driving forces highlighted above, Datça has become one of the emblematic cases indicating the dramatic and complex ways of social, spatial and economic changes in the south Aegean region of Türkiye. These multifarious and intricate changes have sustained and deepened in years; however, their complex urban influences on coastal transformation received inadequate attention from the urban scholarship. The following sections reflect remarkable research evidence on hierarchically linked levels of policymaking at different geographical scales.

Table 2. General population census results and population growth rates of Datça and Muğla, Turkish Statistical Institute.

	General Population Census Results				
	1990	2000	2010	2015	2022
Datça (District)	10,741	13,914	16,475	20,029	25,029
Muğla (Province)	562,089	715,328	817,503	908,877	1.048.185
	Population Growth Rates				
	1990	2000	2010	2015	2022
Datça (District)	100	130	153	186	232
Muğla (Province)	100	127	145	162	187

4.1. Macro-scale intervention: The new governmental regulations to remove natural protection statuses in the peninsula

According to the conservation legislation in Türkiye, a region can contain both national parks, Special Environmental Protection (SEP) zones, as well as natural and cultural heritage sites. The spatial boundaries of these different protection statuses may partially or completely overlap (Yinanç & Sönmez, 2022). This can lead to confusion in terms of the responsible authorities of protection and regulations applied in the region. Datça is a such a complicated region, having diverse statuses and overlapping borders of protection. The entire Datça district/peninsula was determined as a SEP zone, 43 years ago. Moreover, there are various protected sites with different statuses, including Archaeological Sites such as the ancient city of Knidos, protected Nature Parks including Kovanlık, İnbükü and Çubucak and urban conservation site in Eski Datça Neighborhood.

SEP zones are determined within the scope of the Mediterranean Pollution Prevention Convention, to which Türkiye is a party. As the legislative regulation defines, SEP zones are defined as ecologically sensitive sites consisting of endemic, rare, and endangered species in terms of biodiversity, ensuring a natural ecosystem integrity, forming an ecological integrity within the surrounding environments, and being under pressure from human activities and land use functions. SEP zones were initially placed under the authority of the Special Environmental Protection Agency. However, after the establishment of the Ministry of Environment and Forestry in 2011, the spatial planning authority for SEP zones was transferred to the General Directorate of Nature Conservation under the Ministry. The main objectives behind the declaration of Datça as a SEP zone were to preserve productive agricultural areas, to protect natural sites and wetlands, to preserve rural characteristics and rural settlements in the peninsula.

The 1/100.000 scale Aydın Muğla Denizli Environmental Plan approved on 2011, includes Datça-Bozburun

SEP zone. However, the absence of a specific planning decision for this SEP zones and the delegation of planning decisions to lower-scale plans render the environmental plan ineffective in terms of the protection of natural sites (Yazıcı Gökmen, 2018). In lower-scale plans (such as 1/5.000 scale master development plan and 1/1.000 scale supplementary development plan) property development is prioritized over ecological values and the sustainable development principle is lost as there is a striking imbalance between the natural and built environments. Most of the SEP zones in Türkiye have become the center of human attraction, the pressure of construction and property development, tourism development and housing investments.

Within the Datça Peninsula Special Environmental Protection (SEP) zone, natural protection sites of different degrees have also been designated. The Natural Protection Sites including Kızlan, Hızırşah, Emecik, Reşadiye and Karaköy Neighborhoods and Alavara Bay in Emecik Neighborhood were registered by the İzmir 2nd Cultural and Natural Heritage Preservation Board with decision number 5576 dated on 1996. The total size of these natural protected sites in the Datça peninsula was 39633 hectares (Figure 4). Most of the natural sites in the Datça Peninsula were classified as “1st Degree Natural Site Areas”, which represent the highest level of protection.

Although international policies, national protection statuses, conservation decisions and related legislations prioritize the protection of these areas, it is possible to observe conflict-laden decisions in practice. The main reason behind the conflicts stems from the heightened demands of housing, tourism development and accommodation. Although the entire Datça peninsula/district was designated as a SEP zone within the context of a macro-scale legislation in 1991, this conservation-oriented legislation has been eroded in decades as the district has evolved into a popular coastal settlement and unique tourism destination.

This tourism-induced evolvement is fostered and reinforced through a new macro-scale legislative interven-



Figure 4. Current natural protected areas in Datça, ecological-based scientific research report.

tion by the Ministry of Environment and Urbanism (MEU) in 2016, including the new governmental regulation to remove natural protection statuses in the peninsula. This regulation put into practice via a strategic report entitled “Ecologically Based Scientific Research on the Datça Peninsula Natural Sites” officially approved by the MEU. The Ministry approved similar reports for many protected areas across the country to revise the classifications of natural sites and to remove strict protection statuses for these sites and to determine the types and statuses of zoning regulations to enable development for some parts of these sites in the future. According to this new governmental regulation, new categories of natural protection sites are determined to replace the existing 1st, 2nd, and 3rd degree natural site areas (Ministry of Environment and Urbanisation, 2016).

As a macro-scale intervention to the protected natural site areas in Datça, the report and the following decisions by the Ministry have been criticized considerably by Muğla Environmental Platform (MUCEP), based on the principles of ecological diversity, public good and the right to life for all species (MUCEP, 2020). MUCEP’s powerful critique of the report reveals the tourism-induced developmentalist approach of the new governmental regulation on the protected natural site areas in peninsula.

According to MUCEP, the fact that the scientific report for Datça Peninsula was prepared by a real estate company is considered the first point of concern raised. However, the main issue is that the new statuses proposed by the report and decided by the Ministry afterwards aim to reduce the 1st degree natural site areas by approximately 15%, making them available for construction activities of tourism-induced development (Figure 5). On one hand, the report interferes with natural site areas, while on the other hand, the findings in the report leave the door open for decisions that could negatively impact the Datça ecosystem, which was entirely designated as a SEP zone. In other words, the conservative legislation of the SEP zone is transformed via the reorganization of natural site areas by this report and following official decisions by the Ministry. The criticism concentrates on its aim of opening new natural sites for development rather than protecting the ecologically rich values and characteristics of these sites. (MUCEP, 2020).

Recent developments validate the criticisms raised by MUCEP. In February 2020, the MEU decided to facilitate tourism investment and to support some mining activities in Alavara Bay (via the enforcement of a new tourism-oriented development plan) which was a previously preserved natural habitat under the principles and regulations for SEP zone. Moreover, proper-



Figure 5. Comparison of the current natural protected areas and the new criteria proposed by ecologically based scientific research report, created by the authors according to (MUCEP, 2020).

ties in that area are rapidly transferred from residents to foreign real estate companies and tourism developers for the purpose of constructing new buildings and hotels. MUCEP continues its struggle at the legal ground against both the scientific report itself and to cancel development plans for Alavara Bay. As the actors of an environmental right movement, MUCEP's key participants point out that in the future many protected coastal areas in Datça will be opened for tourism-oriented development based on the new governmental regulation removing protection statuses, which is a macro-scale intervention.

4.2. Meso-scale interventions: Strategic projects and plan modifications in the transformation of the coastal areas

As meso-scale interventions, the article critically examines two flagship projects on the coast. The first is a new marina project planned in Taşlık Beach, which is an ongoing and highly disputed one confronted by oppositional movements and serious criticism. The second is the modifications in the development plans prepared for Kargı Bay, the most popular beach in Datça and the new modifications include luxury hotels, accommodations, commercial activities and restaurants and other day-use facilities. In both cases of the meso-scale interventions, it is possible to observe project and plan-

based interventions, the controversial planning processes and the emergence of oppositional movements against the interventions.

Although a new marina project in the city center of Datça has a history of three decades (first proposed in the late 1990s), the current project was initiated by the Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure in 2022 with a model of build-operate-transfer. There is a 1st degree archaeological conservation site very close to the coast. The main criticisms of the yacht marina project are based on the size of the project and its capacity. In the initial proposal in 2022, the marina had a capacity of 550 yachts consisting of breakwater, piers, and slipways (Figure 6). Additionally, the facility included a management building, luxury hotel, restaurants, bars, pool, fuel station, and parking lots. Excavation and construction activities began quickly even before obtaining the necessary permits. It was later discovered that the bay had produced even more landfill than required by the yacht marina project. Owing to the involvement of environmental platforms in the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) process, the construction of the yacht marina was halted, and the area was left idle for a long time [8].

Other criticisms of the new yacht marina project include the allocation of the land in the coastline to a specific group, thereby limiting public access;



Figure 6. *Datça Marina project area, environmental impact assessment report prepared for the Marina.*

the potential risks to nearby city park and İlica pond; and the damage to the marine ecosystem, contrary to the Ministry's claim that the floating pier system would not harm the environment. The EIA process for the initial yacht marina project was halted, and the process was suspended. In the intervening time, an alternative project was developed by the Ministry. In the revised project, the pier areas were redesigned, and the yacht capacity was reduced to 270 [9].

Oppositional movements against the yacht marina project include various methods such as public meetings, panel discussions, press releases and petitions organized by environmentalist activist groups (like MUCEP), appealing courts and opening lawsuits against the project by professional chambers and non-governmental organization, demonstrations and protests etc. As many actors explain their views, there are diverse views within the oppositional movements, some of the opposing groups are entirely against the project, while others accept the necessity of the yacht marina but criticize the existing project in terms of its huge scale, underassessed urban and environmental impacts [10].

On January 30, 2024, the EIA report prepared for the revised project was evaluated positively and approved

(Ministry of Transportation and Infrastructure, 2024). This is a clear sign indicating that the project will be continued to proceed under the ambitious strategy of the Ministry [11]. However, environmental non-governmental organizations and residents in Datça are determined to maintain their criticism and struggle through lawsuits, protests and public meetings.

Kargı Bay, as the most attractive and popular coastal site close to Datça city center and subjected to several legislative and plan-based interventions to trigger tourism-oriented development. In the last decade, two plan modifications could be identified, one is Kargı Bay Development Plan prepared by the MEU, the other regards a privatized area by the Presidency of Privatization Administration at the south of the bay (Figure 7 indicates these two plan modifications, stated below)

As a meso-scale intervention to transform Datça's one of the most popular bays, these two-plan modification not only attempts to lead some individual construction activities, but they also intend to stimulate a huge tourism-oriented development along the coast of Kargı. Furthermore, it is also possible to observe a state-led transfer of the public property to private development. The several parcels amounted to approximately 6 hectares in the 3rd




Figure 7. (a) Kargı bay development plan prepared by ministry of environment and urbanization; (b) Kargı bay development plan prepared by privatization administration.

degree archaeological site, the south of the bay, which had been previously owned by the Ministry of Finance, then included in the privatization program (Privatization Administration, 2023).

For the area in the northwest part of the bay, the MEU prepared a different plan. This plan similarly aims to trigger

tourism-oriented development along the coastline of the bay. The privatizations were carried out on April 5, 2021 [12], while the plan prepared by the MEU was approved on December 13, 2023. Two of the plan modifications dominate luxury and gated tourism development which will inevitably

damage the land and marine ecosystems and restrict the public use of the coast (Alptekin, 2023).

The oppositional movements raised against these two meso-scale interventions to Kargı Bay underline the contested issues of ecological damage, spatial fragmentation and unsustainable tourism development. The first issue criticized in the plan modifications is the fragmentation of the archaeological site and the preparation of development plans by different public institutions. Moreover, although there are two plan-based interventions by two different central government institutions (Ministry of Environment and Urbanism and the Presidency of Privatization Administration) for the same area, the main tourism-dominated rationale and market-driven logic and justifications are the same. According to experts' criticism in lawsuits, Kargı Bay should be considered as an ecological integrity, and its planning should be comprehensive and holistic rather than fragmented and piecemeal (MUCEP, 2023).

The coastline of Kargı Bay is currently occupied by many buildings, accommodation facilities, tiny houses, luxury restaurants, boutique coffees and other daily facilities. These existing activities under current conditions also lead to serious urban planning problems in terms of waste management, sustainable transportation, traffic congestion and parking, environmental pollution and infrastructural inadequacies. It is obvious that if the plan modifications are implemented, then the existing multifarious problems will be exacerbated because of these governmental meso-scale interventions to the bay.

MUCEP as one of the leading oppositional actors and driving forces in the environmental movement raise similar critiques. Nearly 50 citizens living in Datça and volunteers of MUCEP, filed a lawsuit against the development plan modification prepared by the Privatization Administration. As a result of the lawsuit, the Council of State decided to cancel the plans on 07.06.2023. The other plan modification focusing on the northwest of the coast and prepared by the MEU is available on the official website and is still among the plans in force (MUCEP, 2023).

4.3. Micro-scale interventions: The occupation of public beaches for commercial purposes and oppositional struggles

Micro-scale interventions to coastal areas cover the occupation of public beaches and restriction of free and equal use of the public by the multiple strategies of companies and government. Hotels, holiday resorts, restaurants, bars, cafes and all other sorts of companies operated at beaches have enclosing some parts of the publicly owned beaches and seashores through some state-led leasing activities including governmental regulations and municipalities as well. In fact, it is a common practice by hotels unlawfully restricting public access to some parts of the beaches; however, it is striking to observe that even Municipalities in various coastal settlements demand from people the payment of an entrance fee (Çoban, 2018). These activities are legalized through the enforcement of some legislative interventions at the micro-scale, in favor of tourism business and private companies. The main public-use principle clearly stated in the Coastal Law as "anyone who wishes can freely use the beaches" is violated (Aslan & Aslan, 2020).

What are the dominant mechanisms being influential in the micro-scale politics of enclosing public beaches? Three pillars of the enclosure are worth mentioning in this respect. Firstly, the presence of the different public institutions responsible and having authority over the regulation of the public beaches and seashores. This multiple and fragmented authority structure could cause some legal loopholes in the system, which was exploited mostly by private companies. Secondly, the development amnesties applied in the coastal lines and beaches to legalize previously unauthorized buildings could also leads to controversy and contestation over the public role of the beaches. Thirdly, the application of unjust use compensation within the Türkiye's legal system, called "ecrimisil" can also be considered as a specific source of unjust leasing activity triggered by the state. Unjust use compensation refers to compensation arising from the unauthorized use of

property by an individual or a private company lacking rights and authority over it. Since beaches are under the jurisdiction and control of the state, compensation is obtained, and fees are collected from occupying individuals or businesses. However, “ecrimisil” has become perceived by these businesses as a sort of leasing practice. In other words, the occupiers pay their compensation and continue their occupation on the beach. As these dominant micro-scale legislative interventions and associated regulatory practices clearly indicate while affluent classes continue to use beaches by making payments to private companies, the lower-middle income groups excluded from the beaches.

Many examples from public beaches and seashores of Datça could be cited to illustrate the problem. For instance, at Kumluk Beach in the city center, restaurants set up tables on the sandy area in the evenings (Figure 8). Touristic facilities, boutique hotels, gated and luxury villas attempt to designate and to regulate their own private beach areas such as in the seashores of Emecik, Cumalı (known as a popular seashore called Palamutbükü) and Mesudiye (the seashores called Ovabükü and Hayıtbükü) neighborhoods. In specialized areas like Kargı Bay, beach businesses link beach usage with high fees through the dominant practices of enclosure such as sunbed and cabana rentals. Additionally, warnings can be found in various locations throughout the district stating that beaches should not be used by anyone other than property owners in summer houses.

Private companies and tourism businesses occupy public beaches through fixed or mobile elements, depending on the context of the coastal structure. Occupations by the fixed elements involve covering the natural shoreline with concrete, stone, or soil, or constructing buildings and similar structures on the coast. Occupations by mobile elements, on the other hand, usually involve placing sunbeds and umbrellas on the beach, and these occupations are observed to persist intensively throughout the tourism season and repeat every year (Yücel, 2008).

Besides of the all mechanisms and elements influential in the micro-scale intervention to coastal areas, there is a tourism business-driven actor, operated under the name of a public label, called MUCEV, (Muğla Environmental Foundation). MUCEV was established on April 4, 2014, by the direct involvement of the Muğla Governorship, thus its establishment is supported by the state. Although it officially declares its public goal as “increasing the environmental quality based on scientific, efficient, and effective working methods”, it served for tourism-oriented development and service demands, leasing various publicly owned beaches and seashores in Muğla under the jurisdiction and control of the state. MUCEV claims that it will generate revenue by such ways of leasing beaches to private companies and with this way it might be possible to support environmental protection activities and social projects in Muğla [13].

Despite declaring its activities as a public foundation, MUCEV in fact operates as a private corporation in the sake of tourism-driven development and services. The legal basis for MUCEV is the “Regulation on the Administration of Places Under the Jurisdiction and Control of the State in Nature Reserves and Natural Sites, and in Special Environmental Protection Areas”, numbered 28635. In accordance with this government-induced regulation, the MEU allocates these areas to MUCEV and MUCEV’s tenants (private companies in tourism



Figure 8. Occupation of Kumluk Beach by the restaurants, authors' archive, 2024.

business) fill the leased beach areas with sun loungers and umbrellas and implement exorbitant pricing practices (Aslan, 2023).

Although the official website of MUCEV does not openly share information about which beach establishments it leases, it has reportedly leased four separate beach areas to private tourism businesses by obtaining usage rights from the MEU [14]. Leasing agreements in Datça have been made on a yearly basis for Kargı, Karaincir, Kumluk, and Taşlık Beaches, with rent charged per square meter. Although no entrance fee is collected at these beach areas, the use of sun loungers, which effectively occupy the beaches, is subject to a fee. There is no area left for citizens to use apart from the sun loungers.

Several oppositional movements raised against occupation of beaches in Datça, attempting to mobilize a counter politics as an oppositional response to the ongoing micro-scale legislative interventions to the coasts. Various socio-political actors emerge in this process, and they play an oppositional role, including Datça City Council, professional chambers (especially Muğla Branch of the Chambers of Architecture and City Planners), Muğla Environment Platform (MUCEP), Datça Democracy Platform (DDP) and other associated environmentalist non-governmental institutions (such as Datça Environment Foundation – DACEV) and organized local residences. In addition to them, against the occupation of the beaches, a new platform formed and mobilized as a bottom-up initiative called “şezlongsuz Datça” (sunbed-free Datça).

The formation of the “sunbed-free Datça” initiative is remarkable to explain the raise of the oppositional movements against the market-domination over the coastal transformation. This environmentalist group gradually evolved into a bottom-up local social initiative advocating for the preserving the Datça’s beaches in line with the main principles of public interest and ecological diversity. The group developed its repertoire of actions to ensure public ownership of the seashore and to increase the collective use of the coastlines. Examples include the “Joy-

ful Shores Festival” held on June 24-25, 2023, as well as forums and meetings organized together with other non-governmental organizations [15].

Some legal issues constitute a motive behind the rise of the oppositional coastal movements, such as the complexity of the legislation, its varied methods and practices, the prolonged legal processes, the lack of response to official objections, and the non-implementation of penal actions. These legal aspects influence the formation of oppositional movements. Since individual initiatives in many cases remain inconclusive, this might result in giving up the pursuit of rights in the later stages. Nevertheless, politically induced active citizens motivated by the struggle and seek to expand the organized coastal movement. As another recent issue in Türkiye, coastal movements from diverse regions, advocating for the protection of sea, lake, and river ecosystems and struggle for everyone’s free access to the coasts, have gathered together with the call from “sunbed-free Datça” group on spring 2024 and initiated a new organizational platform called “Coastal Movements Solidarity Network” [16] As legislative interventions, government regulations and commercial occupations have targeted capitalist transformation of the coasts, oppositional movements and counter actions have developed in manifold ways.

5. Conclusions

Türkiye’s coastal transformation is a remarkable manifestation to critically analyze the driving force of the state. On the one hand, the coastal law in force does not provide an effective legal basis for the protection of coastal areas. A more nuanced approach to Türkiye’s coastal legislation is essential—one that considers the ecological and social complexities of coastal environments rather than applying a one-size-fits-all solution. On the other hand, due to successive legal interventions, coastal areas are subjected to constant pressure and encroachment. The South Aegean region of Türkiye, being one of the attractive regions in the country in terms of coastal investments, tourism-induced development, reverse migration

and urban economic development trends, including many cases to reveal the coastal transformation under the leading role of the state.

In fact, the state-led coastal transformation in Türkiye unfolds within a three-fold framework of multi-scalar interventions, at macro, meso and micro scales of policymaking. Regional transportation and infrastructure projects, national legislations, the macro changes in the nature conservation decisions, new laws and legislative regulations targeting the coasts have all played transformative interventions at macro-scale. The flagship and profit oriented urban projects such as new yacht ports, new coastal urban design projects, new spatial planning operations and opening natural coastal sites to develop or trigger development for these sites have all become the key meso-scale drivers of the coastal transformation. Lastly, there have been micro-scale interventions to seashores and beaches, embodied in the form of luxury and gated tourism spaces and investments run by private companies, prioritizing high-income groups while restricting public access and transforming the user profile in the coastal areas.

The findings of the research demonstrate that these multi-scalar configurations of the state interventions have been implemented through the various land use functions in many urban development plans, having high rent production potentials, such as luxury housing and gated residents, yacht ports and marinas, shopping malls and tourism spaces. Such dominant practices of the capitalist production of space in the coastal areas are sustained and reinforced by many state legislations and associated government regulations. Thus, Türkiye's coastal transformation unfolds in a state-led strategy prioritizing the capitalist interests over the public good.

However, as our article argues the state-led coastal transformation process in Türkiye incorporates many social and political conflicts, contestations and struggles of a diverse set of actors in urban politics and leads to oppositional movements such as protests and resistance, objections and

criticism and many other forms of citizen activism. At each scale of policymaking, the contentious politics of state-led coastal transformation embarks the rise of multifarious oppositions, and confronted with many commons' movements, several lawsuits and social struggles.

Datça is an emblematic case of the coastal transformation in the South Aegean region of Türkiye. Drawing on the macro, meso and micro scales of the driving forces in the coastal transformation, the article indicated that legislative, plan and project-based interventions operated to stimulate tourism-oriented development and construction activities. As a macro-scale legislative intervention, new governmental regulations regarding the decisions and boundaries of natural conservation areas defines some new "sustainable development zones" for the future of Datça peninsula. Two urban development plans prepared for Kargı Bay and the new yacht port project in the city center have played the role of meso-scale interventions, formed under the dominance of upper scale politics and regulations, impacted the spatial development and coastal regulation practices at the lower scale. Micro scale interventions embodied by some capitalist enclosure practices including luxury hotels and private companies, their occupation of public beaches and restricting equal and free use of beaches, which violates the constitutional law in Türkiye. As the article revealed by concentrating on these three interlinked levels of strategic urban policymaking, counter and resistance movements, protests and oppositional legal actions (lawsuits, official objections etc.) and bottom-up citizen initiatives have developed to response in manifold ways.

The long duration of legal struggle processes, the negative results of lawsuits, the continuation of the contested projects at the background discourage the oppositional actors against the state-led coastal transformation. However, such conditions lead to future possibilities for the repertoire of the struggle by these oppositional groups. The so-called "towel movement", "coastal watch," and the other collec-

tive forms of the coastal movements are key instances against the state-led coastal transformation. The important aspect of these diversified social struggles is that they can shape public opinion faster than lawsuits. These developments have a motivating effect on oppositional groups, cultivating hope for the future of the socio-political struggle. Just as the state's multi-scalar interventions in Türkiye, operated at different urban policy-making levels and sustained to become dominant in time, the bottom-up oppositional movements and active citizen mobilizations could be raised and scale up anti-capitalist motivations of socio-political struggle against these dominant state policies and interventions.

Endnotes

- [1] <https://bianet.org/haber/karadeniz-sahil-yolu-karadenizi-yokedecek-51522>
- [2] <https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/karadeniz-sahil-yolu-plani-8-yil-sonra-iptal-9833>
- [3] <https://t24.com.tr/haber/rize-afet-raporu-karadeniz-sahil-yolu-taskin-sularinin-siddetini-artiriyor-turistik-yerler-heyelan-alani,1123877>
- [4] <https://bianet.org/haber/galataport-projesinin-15-yillik-hikayesi-191930>
- [5] <https://www.istdergi.com/dosya/20-yildir-bu-projeyi-tartisiyoruz-galataport>
- [6] <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/15/world/greece-beach-towel-protests.html>
- [7] <https://www.birgun.net/haber/havlu-hareketi-buyuyor-bir-eylem-de-ayvalikta-460811>
- [8] <https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/cevre/datcadaki-yat-limani-projesi-icin-nihai-karar-verildi-onay-cikmasi-2141278>
- [9] <https://www.birgun.net/makale/yat-limani-datcayi-bozar-534091>
- [10] <https://yesilgazete.org/datca-yat-limani-projesi-ced-onayi-aldi/>
- [11] <https://mucep.org/datca-yat-limani-icin-ced-onayina-itiraz/>
- [12] As a response to objections raised against the privatizations, the Presidency of Privatization Administration published an information note

on the parcels in question in November 2022, which was after the privatizations.

- [13] <https://mucev.com.tr/index.php/hakkimizda/>
- [14] https://www.birgun.net/haber/mucev-datca-yi-da-kusatmis-312212#google_vignette
- [15] <https://www.birgun.net/haber/kiyilar-iscal-edilemez-448329>
- [16] <https://bianet.org/haber/kiyi-hareketleri-dayanisma-agi-kuruldu-295526>

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